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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines how manager and firm characteristics relate to entry decisions 
in US local telephone markets. To do so, it develops a structural econometric model 
that allows managers to be heterogeneous in their ability to correctly conjecture 
competitor behavior. The model adapts Camerer, Ho, and Chong’s (2004) 
Cognitive Hierarchy model to a real-world setting. We observe the industry in 
1998, shortly after the Telecommunications Act of 1996 opened up the market. We 
find that older firms with older, more experienced managers have higher estimated 
levels of strategic ability. Managers with degrees in economics or business, and 
managers with graduate degrees, also have higher estimated levels of strategic 
ability. We find no evidence that university quality is related to ability. We repeat 
this exercise using data from 2000, 2002, and 2004. While the core results do not 
change, the overall level of measured strategic ability increases substantially by 
2004. The estimates of strategic ability are also correlated with survival: those firms 
with lower estimated levels of ability are more likely to exit the industry early.  
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1) Introduction 
Managers make decisions. Sometimes these decisions are made without full information, 
sometimes they are short-sighted, and sometimes they are brilliant. But all in all, the success of a 
company lies in the quality of decisions made by its management. This is why CEO succession is 
a common Wall Street Journal headline. Thus far, however, most empirical economists have 
treated firms as black boxes that make purely rational decisions. While empirical models allow 
heterogeneity in consumer preferences, market characteristics, and other dimensions, empirical 
work has generally failed to recognize the heterogeneity of manager ability. 
The aim of this project is to understand the incidence of management heterogeneity in an 
industry which has experienced a rapid boom and equally rapid bust in less than a decade. The 
passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 opened the competitive local 
telecommunications industry in the United States. Prior to this act, the market had been 
dominated by the incumbent local exchange carriers or “Baby Bells”. While widespread 
competition is still not the norm, the 1996 Act led to substantial entry. The entrants (known as 
competitive local exchange carriers or CLECs) varied substantially in size, telecommunications 
experience, and management. New firms run by 35 year-old university dropouts competed 
alongside decades-old firms with educated, experienced, professional managers. These managers 
chose which cities and towns the firms should enter following the opening of the market.  
NETtel Corporation provides a useful example. NETtel offered medium-sized business 
customers local and long distance telephony as well as data services. Founded in 1996 and run 
by a young CEO, NETtel expanded quickly into many large cities, paying out $70 million on 
capital expenditures in 1999 alone. In these large markets, NETtel often competed with six or 
more other CLECs for the same customer base. The company went bankrupt in late 2000 and 
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ceased operations in 2001. One cannot help but wondering: Did they fully consider the 
competition they might encounter? Might a more experienced manager have helped? 
We explore these possibilities by applying a model of iterated decision-making to the 
real-world entry decisions of these local telephone carriers. Numerous laboratory experiments 
show that people are heterogeneous in the strategies they use to play games.1 Simply, some 
people are better at playing games than others. While “better” has several dimensions, the 
laboratory research has shown substantial heterogeneity in the ability of players to correctly 
conjecture competitor behavior. This heterogeneity does not appear to be random; rather, the 
observed behavior is consistent with an iterative decision process in which some participants do 
not consider the other players, others consider the other players but do not consider that the other 
players will consider them, etc. (Camerer 2003). An implicit assumption in most laboratory 
research is that the results will be applicable to situations outside the laboratory. Since a key 
application of game theory in economics is to understand the behavior of firms in competitive 
situations, the experimental evidence suggests that some managers may be better at making 
conjectures about competitor behavior than others.  
There are several related models that allow for heterogeneity in the ability of players to 
correctly conjecture competitor behavior in entry games including quantal response equilibrium 
(e.g. McKelvey and Palfrey 1995), level-k thinking (e.g. Costa-Gomes and Crawford 2006), and 
cognitive hierarchy (e.g. Camerer, Ho, and Chong 2004). For our purposes, cognitive hierarchy 
(henceforth CH) models the heterogeneity in an especially useful way because it includes a 
parameter that unambiguously identifies players as being better at playing the game. In 
particular, players have types 0 to K. A type 0 player does not consider the competition. A type 1 
player acts as if all other players are type 0. A type 2 player acts as if all other players are 
                                                            
1 Camerer (2003) provides a comprehensive review.  
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distributed between type 0 and type 1. And a type k player acts as if all other players are 
distributed between type 0 and type k-1. Unlike games featuring Nash equilibria with fully 
rational players, this hierarchy yields a unique solution. We can therefore determine the identities 
of entrants and include manager and firm characteristics in our estimation. Relying on prior 
research, we interpret the hierarchy as a measure of strategic ability.2 This interpretation allows 
us to examine which firm and CEO characteristics are associated with strategic ability. Further, it 
allows us to estimate how the overall level of ability changes over time and how the level of 
ability correlates with firm success.  
Specifically, we look at the entry decisions of facilities-based CLECs in 234 midsize US 
markets with populations between 100,000 and 1,000,000 as of the 2000 census. We observe 
each market that each CLEC entered in 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004. We focus on 1998, where 
the decision can most reasonably be treated as simultaneous because the industry was new and 
firms had less time to react to others’ decisions. We also examine how strategic ability changes 
through the industry’s boom, bust, and partial recovery.  
From the 1998 data we have four major findings. First, although journalists like to play 
up unobservables such as charisma and leadership as driving CEO success, we find that the 
traditional wisdom of checking out a manager’s curriculum vita works. Older, more experienced, 
and highly educated managers tend to correctly conjecture competitor behavior. Hiring a 35 year 
old as CEO can be quite risky. Managers that studied economics or business in university are 
especially likely to consider the competition. While level and field of education matter, we find 
no evidence of a correlation between school quality and strategic ability. Second, the experience 
                                                            
2 Camerer and Johnson (2004) tracked how long subjects looked at competitor payoffs and found that measured 
strategic ability is positively correlated with time spent looking at competitor payoffs. Bosch-Domenech et al. 
(2002) asked subjects in a beauty contest game to explain their choices and found that people explain their actions 
with logic based on thinking steps.  
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and incentive structure of a firm play an important role in manager behavior. Firms that are older 
or financed by venture capital tend to be strategic in their choice of markets, while those that are 
subsidiaries tend not to. Third, we find that the estimation of this strategic ability parameter has 
validity in predicting outcomes outside our estimation window: firms with managers of higher 
caliber are more likely to stay in business. In short, smarter firms make smarter moves and 
survive. Fourth and last, simulation results show that although more strategic players have much 
less ex-post regret, strategic ability is not monotonically related to the level of competition. At 
very low levels of ability, we see considerable over-entry while at moderate levels we see under-
entry. At high levels of ability, entry rates stabilize. 
Comparing results across years, we find that the estimated level of ability is steady or 
perhaps falling before the shakeout and then rises sharply. By 2004, the measured level of ability 
is substantially higher than in 1998. The measure of ability requires a slightly different 
interpretation in the later years because firms could observe what competitors did in the prior 
periods. Therefore, the applicability of a simultaneous entry game into this setting is less 
appropriate. Rather than focus on interpreting the coefficients, we focus on the change in ability 
over time. We interpret the increase in measured ability after the shakeout as supporting 
evidence for an evolution towards the long-run equilibrium outcome assumed in much of the 
existing simultaneous entry literature (e.g. Greenstein and Mazzeo 2006, p. 337).  
While a growing literature explores how manager and firm characteristics relate to 
outcomes (e.g. Chevalier and Ellison 1999, Bertrand and Schoar 2003), this is the first paper to 
structurally examine how these characteristics correlate with firm strategies in a real-world 
setting. Our structure allows us to examine how the ability to correctly conjecture competitor 
behavior correlates with manager education and income, and how it changes over time. We apply 
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this structure to a unique combination of data that integrates manager and firm characteristics 
with entry decisions in the first years of a new industry. Next, we discuss several papers that put 
our study in context and provide details of the CLEC environment that motivate our choice to 
apply the CH model. The model, data, and results follow. We conclude with a discussion of 
limitations and of the general implications of our results. 
  
2) Background and Literature 
This paper addresses four distinct topics. First we discuss the nature of local telephone 
competition in the United States and explain why a model that allows for heterogeneity in 
strategic ability is particularly important here. Second, we discuss behavioral game theory, 
emphasizing the details of the CH model. Third, we discuss how our research relates to the 
literature on empirical discrete choice models of firm interactions. Finally, we build a list of 
potential correlates with strategic ability by discussing a literature that relates firm and CEO 
characteristics to actions and performance.  
 
Local Telephone Competition 
 Between the Kingsbury Commitment of 1913 and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
there was little competition in local telecommunications in the United States. The 1996 Act 
opened up local competition, primarily by barring state regulators from denying entrants the right 
to compete and by forcing incumbent carriers to allow competitors to interconnect (Crandall 
2005). It took until 1998 for entry to be observed on any scale, and by 2000 there were 98 
CLECs operating in a total of 190 different mid-sized US cities.3 A shakeout followed, and by 
                                                            
3 We focus on mid-sized cities (with population between 100,000 and 1 million) for two reasons. First, smaller 
places are typically non-urban areas that contained few high-value business customers to attract CLECs. Second, 
larger cities often contain several sub-markets so it is difficult to determine the existence and scope of strategic 
interactions among entrants.  
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2004 there were just 53 CLECs operating in 187 locations. Of the CLECs that were licensed to 
enter these mid-sized markets in 1998, just 40% survived independently through 2004.  
Both Goldstein (2005) and Crandall (2005) provide detailed histories of 
telecommunications competition following the 1996 Act; and both emphasize that many CLECs 
entered into the same markets and ended up competing fiercely with each other. For example, 
Goldstein (2005, p. 116) wrote that it seems “likely that the CAPs [CLECs] did not count on 
each other’s dividing the take,” and that this led to lower than expected revenues and large 
losses. Crandall (2005, p. 39) emphasized that “a major problem for the new competitors is their 
proliferation in a given market.” Their assessments suggest that the ability to correctly conjecture 
the number of competitors that will enter a market is an important determinant of success.  
 Network Plus Corporation and Sage Telecom provide a useful contrast to underscore this 
point. Network Plus expanded quickly from the start. Run by a 30-something CEO with a 
background as a NYNEX sales agent, Network Plus entered many major markets by the end of 
1999 including New York City, Chicago, Los Angeles, Atlanta, and Miami. The 1999 annual 
report states “Our plan is to establish a single contiguous network footprint from New England to 
Florida.” They went bankrupt in 2002. Sage Telecom, on the other hand, was carefully focused 
on rural and suburban markets with no other entrants, first in Texas and then in a handful of 
other states. Run by a former long distance company executive, the company focused on 
controlling spending and expanding the number of customers in the few markets it operated. 
Sage survived the shakeout and continued to grow slowly until they were purchased by a private 
investment firm in 2007. 
 In addition to this anecdotal support for our modeling framework, our data suggest 
intriguing link between considering the competition, management characteristics, and eventual 
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survival. Figure 1 presents data from 1998 and shows that being the only player in the market 
appears to be systematically correlated with manager and firm characteristics.4 Firms run by 
managers with economics or business degrees are much more likely to be the only firm operating 
in a market. Further, older firms, and firms run by older managers, are more likely to be the only 
competitors in the markets they enter. The figure also shows that survival through 2004 is 
strongly correlated with being the only player in the market. Moreover, a comparison of entry 
patterns immediately surrounding the industry “meltdown” in 2001 suggests that firms started to 
differentiate better. In 2000, 18.8% of markets had no competitors, 12.8% had just one 
competitor, and 38.5% had six or more competitors. By 2002, 16.7% of markets had no 
competitors, 17.5% had just one, and 29.5% had six or more. Thus while firms were exiting from 
the markets with the fiercest competition, firms were entering markets without any competition. 
Rather than a meltdown that affected all firms and places equally, this suggests that the 
meltdown had its biggest impact in the areas with the most competition. Areas that were 
attractive due to low levels of competition experienced net entry even during the worse years of 
the telecom crash.  
The above stylized facts suggest that managers with different personal backgrounds tend 
to act differently, and that competition plays a role in the success of individual firms and the 
evolution of market structure. Putting these facts together, we hypothesize that the abilities and 
experiences of managers have an impact on firm strategies and on outcomes. Therefore, we 
apply a model of heterogeneity in ability that matches manager characteristics to strategic entry 
decisions.  
Before describing models of strategic ability in more detail, we conclude the section on 
local telephone competition by noting that our paper is not the first to examine competition in 
                                                            
4 The results in the 2000 data are similar. 
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local telephone markets. Closest to our work is Greenstein and Mazzeo (2006). They examine 
CLEC entry decisions using a similar underlying structural model to ours, though they do not 
allow for heterogeneity in managerial ability. Instead, they emphasize another aspect of 
heterogeneity: heterogeneity in product characteristics defined by differences between national 
and local CLECs. Our paper therefore complements theirs in that both emphasize the importance 
of firm-level heterogeneity in understanding the CLEC market. We emphasize ability while 
Greenstein and Mazzeo emphasize product variation. Other papers on local telephone 
competition include Economides, Seim, and Viard (2008) on the consumer welfare effects of the 
increase in local phone competition between 1999 and 2003 in New York state and Mini (2001) 
and Alexander and Feinberg (2004) on the behavior of incumbent carriers in using non-price 
levers to restrict entry. Our paper takes a unique perspective on local telephone competition by 
using behavioral game theory as a framework for understanding several interesting patterns in 
the data. 
 
Behavioral Game theory and the CH Model 
The first step in building an entry model which links managerial ability with strategic 
actions is to select an estimable behavioral game theory model which fits our real world 
oligopolistic setting. Camerer’s (2003) textbook provides a detailed review of behavioral game 
theory and how it differs from standard game theory. A key difference is that behavioral game 
theory has used laboratory-based evidence to adjust standard models to account for bounded 
rationality and personal biases. Of particular relevance to this research are the models of play in 
simultaneous games, including quantal response equilibrium, level-k thinking, and cognitive 
hierarchy (CH). We focus on CH for its clarity and parsimony in our context. Specifically, CH 
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includes a single parameter that unambiguously identifies players as being better at playing the 
game.5  
Specifically, in CH theory there is a hierarchy of rationality. Type 0 players do not 
consider their competitors; they either pick randomly (as in Camerer, Ho, and Chong 2004) or 
they act as if the competition is not relevant to their decision (as in Goldfarb and Yang 2008). 
Type 1 players assume all other players are type 0; type 2 players assume all other players are a 
combination of types 0 and 1; type k players assume all other players are distributed between 
types 0 and k-1. A Poisson distribution effectively describes the distribution of types in lab 
experiments and the model assumes that a type k player assumes all other players are distributed 
with a truncated (between type 0 and type k-1) version of the same Poisson distribution. In this 
model, higher types have what Chong, Camerer, and Ho (2005) call “increasingly rational 
expectations” in that the absolute total deviation between type k’s beliefs and the true 
frequencies fall as k rises. Therefore, for high enough k, type k and type k+1 players will have 
approximately the same beliefs. Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) show that CH works well in 
both entry games and “beauty contest” games (Nagel 1995; Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt 1998).6  
The most distinctive feature of the CH model lies in the limited rationality of all players, 
who fail to recognize the existence of other equally, if not more, strategic players. Beliefs are 
therefore not mutually consistent. Instead, each player acts if they can perfectly predict their 
rivals’ actions, leading to a unique outcome. This outcome can be short lived because players 
may revise their beliefs and have an incentive to deviate once they observe other’s actions. This 
                                                            
5 Haile, Hortacsu, and Kosenok (2008) show that quantal response equilibrium is not separately identified from a 
perfect Bayesian equilibrium with noise and therefore strategic ability is not identified. K-step models other than CH 
allow for players to be too sophisticated in that they overestimate the ability of their competitors and end up 
performing worse. The CH model is useful here because it defines sophisticated players as those who better 
conjecture competitor behavior. 
6 In the standard beauty contest game, players are asked to pick a number between 1 and 100. The winner is the 
player who chooses the number closest to two-thirds of the average of all the players. Using diverse subject pools, 
the Nash outcome of all players choosing 1 explains actual choices poorly.  
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outcome can also be long lasting if changing actions is time-consuming and costly, or noises in 
the environment delay, or even prevent, players from updating their beliefs. While fully 
acknowledging the caveats of the CH model, we argue that our focus on a new industry, where 
naivety and noise are prevalent, gives us an ideal platform for the application of the CH model.  
 A small literature has taken this model and examined its consequences for market 
outcomes. Hossain and Morgan (2007) develop a theoretical model that shows that in a two-
sided market, when players behave according to a cognitive hierarchy model rather than a 
standard equilibrium model, the market often has a unique tipped equilibrium. Goldfarb and 
Yang (2008) show that strategic ability slows the diffusion of a new product when retailers are 
strategic. We are not aware of any paper that has explored how manager and firm characteristics 
correlate with strategic ability as identified by a behavioral game theory model. 
 
Empirical Models of Firm Interactions 
 We apply the CH model to an entry game. There is a rich literature on estimation of entry 
games in economics starting with Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991), who link population 
thresholds for entry with changes in firms’ competitive conduct by estimating a static entry game 
using cross sectional variation in the number of firms and population. The numerous papers that 
extended the Bresnahan and Reiss framework to other settings try to better accommodate firm-
level heterogeneity into the model. The main challenge in modeling heterogeneous firms’ 
strategic entry in a simultaneous setting is that multiple equilibria almost always arise. Previous 
researchers have had to forgo firm-level information and only study the numbers of different 
types of entrants in an equilibrium (Mazzeo 2002; Greenstein and Mazzeo 2006; Augereau, 
Greenstein, and Rysman 2006), to revise certain features of the game such as information 
structure (Seim 2006), to estimate the game under different equilibria to check robustness (Jia 
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2006), or to focus on bounds instead of point identification (Ciliberto and Tamer 2007). Our 
paper provides a solution to this problem from an alternative angle. By revising the behavioral 
assumption from complete to limited rationality, we are able to pin down a unique outcome, and 
are therefore able to utilize rich firm-level information in an entry game instead of abstracting 
the differences away or just focusing on a few categorical variables. Further, by adding a 
structural parameter of strategic ability to the standard entry models, it is possible to conduct 
counterfactuals to assess how manager and firm characteristics influence entry decisions and 
industry evolution.  
 A small number of other papers have explored estimating behavioral biases in games 
played by real-world firms. Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2008) develop a semi-parametric model 
to estimate rationalizability but do not take it to data. Consistent with the rationalizability 
literature (e.g. Bernheim 1984), they model level 0 as the set of all possible actions, level 1 as the 
set of all possible best responses to level 0, level 2 as the set of all best responses to level 1 (that 
are also best responses to level 0), etc. In contrast, our approach is parametric and we impose 
more structure on the meaning of level 0. This structure allows us to estimate heterogeneity in 
strategic ability rather than a lower bound on the level of ability in the market. Brown, Camerer, 
and Lovallo (2007) also impose structure and compare quantal response equilibrium, cursed 
equilibrium, and CH in the context of movie distributors’ decisions to show movies to critics. 
Hortacsu and Puller (2007) show that older, more experienced firms behave closer to the Nash 
equilibrium prediction than other firms in electricity auctions. Che, Sudhir, and Seetharaman 
(2007) and Lim and Ho (2007) also explore the consequences of behavioral assumptions to 
firms. Finally, Goldfarb and Yang (2008) apply a similar CH-based model to data on 56k modem 
adoption by Internet Service Providers. Lacking data on manager and firm characteristics, 
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Goldfarb and Yang emphasize the simulation results showing that firms with higher estimated 
ability were more likely to exist 10 years later and an increase in strategic ability would have 
slowed the diffusion of 56k modems. 
 
Relating Firm and Manager Characteristics to Actions and Performance 
By exploring which firm and CEO characteristics correlate with more steps of thinking, 
we address a growing literature that examines the link between firm (and CEO) characteristics 
and firm performance. Bloom and Van Reenan (2007) examine the correlation between 
management practices, management characteristics, and firm performance. They provide 
evidence of heterogeneity in the ability of managers. They also suggest some potential correlates 
with decision quality, including whether the firm is privately owned and the level of product 
market competition. Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) emphasize the role of firm age in 
decision-making and survival. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) track top managers as they move 
across firms and show robust evidence of heterogeneity in manager ability. Further, they find 
that older executives tend to be more conservative while managers with an MBA tend to be more 
aggressive. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) study the relationship between market excess returns 
and manager characteristics using a cross section of mutual funds managers. They find that 
managers who attended undergraduate institutions with higher average student SAT scores 
obtain higher returns even after adjusting for behavior differences and selection biases. Other 
papers that address similar themes are discussed in Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler’s (2007) review 
article on behavioral corporate finance. Laboratory research also suggests correlations between 
characteristics and ability. Chong, Camerer, and Ho (2005) show that strategic ability is 
correlated with education level and quality and with training in game theory. Slonim (2005) 
shows that ability is correlated with experience.  
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 This literature therefore suggests many possible covariates to include in our assessment 
of which firm and manager characteristics might be correlated with ability: firm age, firm 
ownership structure (private or public), whether the firm is venture capital backed, whether the 
firm is a subsidiary of a larger telecommunications firm, manager age, manager experience, 
manager education level, quality, and field, including whether the manager is trained in game 
theory (measured by business or economics education). We explore each of these covariates in 
our empirical analysis. 
 
3) Model 
In this section we describe how we model heterogeneity in managerial ability in a real-
world oligopolistic entry game.7 There are two significant deviations of our empirical model 
from the one used in laboratory experiments. First, we incorporate market- and firm-level 
covariates in order to allow for entry incentives to vary across markets and managerial ability to 
vary across firms. In the laboratory, the controlled environment meant this was not necessary. 
Second, type 0 players in our model choose whether to enter based on the expected profitability 
of the market without any competitors rather than choosing randomly as in Camerer, Ho, and 
Chong (2004). This is a more reasonable assumption in a real world setting because it is unlikely 
firms are unaware of public information or deliberately ignore the fact that larger markets have 
more potential customers. Higher-level players consider their competitors’ behavior while 
evaluating the potential payoffs of each strategy.  
More formally, at a given time period there are mJ  potential entrants simultaneously 
deciding whether to enter market m . Market demand is public information except for a firm- and 
market-specific stochastic term. All firms make decisions based on expected market profitability 
                                                            
7 This section builds on the estimation strategy in Goldfarb and Yang (2008). 
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and expected competition with other firms. However, these firms have different levels of 
strategic ability, type k  ( )0,1,2...k = , which is drawn from a Poisson distribution with parameter 
jτ ( )1,2,..., mj J= . jτ  is a deterministic function of firm attributes such as ownership structure 
and firm age and manager characteristics such as manager experience and education. 
Parametrically, 0exp( )j jZτ γ γ= +  where jZ  is a vector of all the covariates which affect the 
strategic ability of firm j .8 Firm j  does not observe its competitors’ specific types, but all jτ  is 
public information. 
As jτ  increases, firm j  is more likely to be a higher type player who has a better 
perception about the type distributions of its potential competitors. A type k  player believes all 
its competitors have lower types up to 1k − . Specifically, it believes that a potential competitor i  
( )i j≠ is distributed with a Poisson distribution truncated at 1k −  with parameter iτ . If the 
potential competitor i  has a high iτ , firm j  will perceive i  as more likely to be a higher type 
and act more strategically. 
A potential entrant decides whether the expected discounted value of the future profit 
stream is sufficiently high to support its entry. Firm j  considering entering market m  has an 
expected discounted value of future profits conditioning on its type k , which is specified below: 
( ) ( )0| # | , ,jm m m i jmE k X E entrants X kβ β ψ τ εΠ = + + +    (1) 
We adopt the above reduced-form profit function for its tractability. Equation (1) states that the 
type-variant expected discounted value of future profits, ( )|jmE kΠ , depends on a vector of time-
invariant market attributes mX , a perceived competition variable that will be discussed below, 
                                                            
8 We use exponential functional form to ensure jτ  is non-negative, as required by the Poisson distribution. 
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and an idiosyncratic error term with standard normal distribution reflecting unobserved firm- and 
market- specific heterogeneity in expected profits. The entry decision of firm j  is a dichotomous 
variable { }0,1jmD ∈  where 1jmD =  if of firm j  enters market m and 0jmD =  otherwise. Firm 
j will enter the local market if the expected discounted value of future profits is positive, that is, 
1jmD =  if ( )| 0jmE kΠ ≥ , and 0jmD =  otherwise.  
In the above formulation, mX  contains market-level variables that might affect the 
profitability of market m . Market size as measured by population is a key element, as in 
Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991) and the literature that followed. In the local telephone market, 
other plausible elements of mX  include local demographic variables such as race, age, household 
size, population mobility, household income, and unemployment rate.  
The focus of this study is each firm’s perception about the competition it will encounter 
upon entry, i.e., ( )# | , ,m iE entrants X kτ  in equation (1). The expectation is conditioned on each 
firm’s own type, all the potential entrants’ strategic ability, and market attributes. A type 0 firm, 
which does not take competitor entry into consideration, has expected discounted value of future 
profits of: 
( ) 0| 0jm m jmE Xβ β εΠ = + +     (2) 
A type 1 firm, which perceives all its potential competitors as type 0 players, has expected 
discounted value of future profits of:    
( ) ( )0|1 | , ,0 ,1jm m im m i jm
i j
E X E D X Truncated Poissonβ β ψ τ ε
≠
⎛ ⎞Π = + + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑   (3) 
where ( ),0iTruncated Poisson τ  means that firm j , as a type 1 player, perceives any of its 
potential competitor i ’s type to be drawn from a Poisson distribution with parameter iτ  and 
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truncated at 0. For a type 1, the distribution assumed is therefore not relevant: the truncation 
means that the type 1 player assigns 100% probability to its competitor’s likelihood of being a 
type 0. The type 1 then uses the profit function specified in (2) to figure out expected number of 
entrants. We can iterate the same logic and write down any type’s expected discounted value of 
future profits in the same fashion. For a firm of type 1k > , its perceived distribution of its 
competitor types is drawn from ( ), 1iTruncated Poisson kτ − . As k  increases, the discrepancy 
between ( ), 1iTruncated Poisson kτ −  and ( ),iTruncated Poisson kτ  gradually disappears and the 
truncated Poisson gradually approaches the real Poisson distribution. That is, a high type player 
is able make decisions based on nearly correct beliefs on its rivals expected behavior. 9 
The estimated parameters are 0 0[ , , , , ]θ β β ψ γ γ= , where β  measures how a firm’ 
expectation about a market’s profitability is affected by mX , ψ measures how the same 
expectation is affected by the perceived competition, and γ  measures how firm- and manager-
specific characteristics shift a firm’s strategic ability. As econometricians we do not observe any 
given firm’s type. Therefore, to estimate θ , we need to evaluate each firm’s entry probabilities 
conditioning on all possible types, and then integrate these probabilities over the distribution of 
types to predict the entry probability of this firm. We match the entry probabilities of all firms to 
the data using a standard maximum likelihood procedure. Specifically: 
$ ( ) ( )( )1
,
arg max ln 1 0jm jm
D D
jm jm
j m
prob D prob Dθ −= = =∑    (4) 
To conclude this section we discuss the identification of this model. We identify the 
degree to which manager and firm characteristics correlate with the latent ability distribution 
                                                            
9 In estimation, we need to pick a maximum number of types because it is impossible to derive entry likelihood for 
an infinite number of types. We do this by increasing the number of types and repeating the estimation until the 
results no longer change. In our analysis, the results are stable at 8 or more types. 
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parameter, jτ , rather than the exact number of steps of consideration the firms undergo. The 
number of steps of consideration, or the type of a firm, is the firm’s private information, and 
therefore both the firm’s rivals and we the econometricians can only assess of the probability of 
each possible type given our observation or estimate of jτ , which is a function of firm- and 
manager-specific characteristics. Given that we observe firms with different firm- and manager-
specific characteristics make systematically different entry decisions in markets with the same 
number of entrants, holding all other markets attributes constant, the relationship between the 
firm and manager characteristics and jτ  is identified from an exclusion restriction and the scale 
of jτ  is identified off of the Poisson and 0exp( )j jZτ γ γ= +  functional forms. To be more 
concrete, suppose we observe in data that firms with more experienced managers are 
systematically less likely to enter markets with a large number of competitors, we know that the 
experiences of managers lead to high jτ  and therefore the possibility of high types. In order to 
determine the impact of firm- and manager-specific characteristics on a firm’s ability to consider 
its competition, we need these characteristics to be excluded from the covariates that determine 
market profitability outside of perceived competition. Therefore, we assume that manager 
characteristics such as age, education, and experience only affect profitability through their 
impact on manager decisions. In other words, γ  is identified to the extent that a manager’s 
education is not correlated with a firm’s propensity to enter markets with few competitors, 
except through strategic decision-making. We feel this is reasonable because it seems unlikely 
that customers will be drawn to a company simply because its CEO has a graduate degree.  
It is less clear, however, that all firm attributes should belong to the jτ  function 
exclusively. For example, an older firm may be able to make better strategic decisions, but it 
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may also have accumulated some brand value over time so any market will be more profitable 
irrespective of competition. To deal with this issue, we carefully select firm attributes that are 
less likely to affect city-level profitability directly, such as ownership and financial structure. 
Further, in assessing whether the predicted value of ability is related to early exit from the 
industry, we include controls for firm attributes. As a final point on identification, we note that 
the constant term in jτ  is identified from the functional form of the strategic ability function. 
While we have explored robustness to alternative functional forms and found largely similar 
results, we need to be cautious in our interpretation of the overall level of strategic ability in the 
market. We can, however, compare across markets and across years given that we use the same 
functional form assumptions throughout. 
 
4) Data 
We combine information from several different sources to create a unique dataset which 
contains details on firms’ entry decisions, firm- and manager-level characteristics, and market 
attributes.  
First, we acquired the 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004 CLEC annual reports from the New 
Paradigm Resources Group, Inc. (NPRG). These reports contain information on the universe of 
facilities-based CLECs in the United States since the passage of 1996 Telecommunication Act. 
NPRG provides a detailed profile for every CLEC on its history, management, ownership and 
organization, technology, state certification and ILEC (incumbent telephone companies or “Baby 
Bells”) connection agreements, and the location of its local voice and data networks. From the 
profiles, we know all local voice markets a CLEC served and the exact year of the entry. We 
have firm attributes such as the year the company was founded, whether the company is public 
or private, whether the company is venture capital backed, and whether the company is a wholly 
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owned subsidiary of a larger communications company, which affect the incentives and 
influence of managers over company decisions.  
Second, using the information on CEO names from the NPRG reports, we conducted a 
thorough search of several public archived sources to identify CEO characteristics including 
education (highest degree, field of study, and school attended), age, and industry experience. For 
public companies, this information is typically available in the Form 10-K annual business and 
financial report. For private companies (and to fill out the remaining gaps for managers of the 
public companies), we used a variety of public sources including Who’s Who directories, news 
archives, company websites, and other internet sources.10 In the end, we have education 
information for 75% of the CEOs in our data, and age and experience information for 74%. 
When the data are missing, rather than drop those firms from our sample, we code the values as 
zero and create “missing data” covariates for experience, age, and education as controls. The 
coefficients on the missing data covariates have no economic interpretation.  
Lastly, we obtain information on location characteristics from the 2000 US Census. The 
locations in the NPRG reports are best interpreted at the census “place” level, rather than the 
county or metropolitan statistical area. The Census provides place-level demographic 
information from the Census of Population but not place-level business information from the 
Economic Census. We selected the following variables for our analysis: population, household 
                                                            
10 Both coauthors and an undergraduate research assistant conducted the search. All information found by the 
research assistant was confirmed by one of the coauthors. The search algorithm was as follows: (1) if public, search 
10-K reports for biographical information (otherwise skip to step 2), (2) search company websites for biographical 
information, (3) search Who’s Who archives, (4) search news archives for mentions of the company and the 
individual in the same article (allow for alternative names such as Bob for Robert), (5) search Google for mentions 
of the company and the individual, (6) search news archives and Google for mentions of the individual. Then 
confirm that it is the correct individual by triangulating with other sources on the individual’s career path, (7) have a 
second person visit each source and confirm. If we were unsure about the match between the CLEC manager and the 
individual found in our search, we did not include the data (for example, we found information about a “Karl 
Douglas” with links to the telecommunications industry but we could not confirm that it was the Karl Douglas from 
REACH Communications”).  
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income, racial composition, median age, number foreign born, household size, and 
unemployment. 
This combination of NPRG data, manager characteristics data, and census data has 
several appealing features. We have information on all entry by all firms from the effective start 
of the industry. We can match this to rich data on firm and manager characteristics, including 
information on manager education and experience, and to measures of the demographic appeal of 
each market. Finally, a feature of the local telephone industry enables us identify a set of 
potential entrants in each market without assuming all firms can operate everywhere. 
Specifically, CLECs must first be approved by state regulators before they can operate in a given 
state. Once approved, the CLEC can operate anywhere it chooses within the state. Therefore, we 
identify potential entrants as the set of CLECs approved to operate in the state.11 
Tables 1a, 1b, and 1c provide descriptive statistics. Table 1a shows that these firms are 
generally privately owned (64.5% in 1998) and have a high variance in age (the standard 
deviation is over twice the mean of 7.9 years in 1998). The managers average 18 years 
experience in the industry and are highly educated. Of the firms operating in 1998, 58% of 
managers have a graduate degree and 78% have at least one degree in economics or business. 
The table also shows the high turnover rate in the industry. Nearly 60% of the firms that operated 
in 1998 were no longer operating in 2004. The timing of the shakeout is clear: 50% of the firms 
operating in 2000 were gone by the end of 2002. Table 1b describes the 234 mid-size cities that 
we use in our analysis. Table 1c summarizes the data at the firm-market level. 
 
 
                                                            
11 It is important to note that while regulatory approval is necessary for entry, it is not sufficient. Among the 98 
CLECs approved to operate in 1998, just 56 actually entered at least one market in that year and only 79 had entered 
by 2004. Based on the NPRG reports, we believe that our definition of potential entrants is both simple and realistic. 
We check the robustness of our definition by excluding CLECs that had not entered anywhere by 2004. 
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5) Results 
We estimate each year separately as a static simultaneous game.12 We first discuss the 
coefficient estimates for 1998. As discussed above, this was effectively the first year of the 
industry. Therefore the entry decisions in this period are more likely to be truly simultaneous. 
After discussing coefficient estimates, we discuss the correlation of the estimates of strategic 
ability with survival and we simulate the consequences of changing the level of ability. At the 
end of this section, we examine how the results change over time. 
 
5.1) What drives strategic ability? 
In this sub-section we examine whether the standard information on a manager’s 
biography relates to strategic ability. We also relate firm characteristics to ability. Table 2 
column 1 shows the main results. The top part of the table shows the coefficients for the strategic 
ability function and the bottom part of the table shows the coefficients for market attributes used 
in estimating the latent profitability of entry. Before turning to analysis of firm- and manager-
level characteristics, we note the strong negative relationship between the number of competitors 
and the level of entry (row 17). This is the most statistically significant result in almost all 
specifications and shows that firms appear to know, on average, that they should avoid direct 
competition. Therefore, it will be empirically relevant to examine how variation in strategic 
ability leads to variation in the avoidance of competition. 
Rows 1 to 4 show the coefficients for firm-level characteristics in driving measured 
ability (τ ) and rows 5 to 11 show coefficients for manager-level characteristics. In discussing 
the results, we focus on three areas: experience, education, and ownership structure. 
                                                            
12 The analysis of the data from subsequent years (2000, 2002, and 2004) allows us to explore whether and how 
decisions improve over time. A fully dynamic CH model has not yet been developed and therefore it is not clear 
how to apply it to a real-world empirical setting. 
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Experience: Experience is widely viewed as an asset for managers. It is emphasized in 
manager bios and on company annual reports. Laboratory research has shown experience is 
positively correlated with ability in beauty contest games (Slonim 2005), and other research has 
documented a relationship between experience (measured at the firm or manager level) and 
behavior. Our results support the idea that ability is positively correlated with experience. 
Specifically, we find that older firms have higher values of τ  (row 1). Older managers also have 
higher levels of τ  and managers under 40 have especially low levels of τ  (rows 9 and 10).We 
define age by three dummy variables rather than as a continuous measure in order to starkly test 
the hypothesis that ability improves with age up to a point, but then decreases for managers more 
than one standard deviation above the mean. Our results reject the idea that older managers 
become less sophisticated as they age. Instead, we find that 30-something CEOs tend to act 
naively about competition, supporting the traditional industry practice of hiring middle-aged 
CEOs. Further, while not significant in all specifications, the manager’s experience in the 
industry is positively correlated with τ  ( row 11).  
Education: We examine three different aspects of education: education level (row 5), 
education field (rows 6 and 7), and education quality (row 8). Whether education provides value 
or merely functions as a signal of ability, it should be correlated with the ability of managers. 
Encouragingly (for those of us in academia), managers with a graduate degree have higher levels 
of τ . Further, managers with a degree in either economics or business (where they likely learned 
about game theory) have higher levels of τ . The quality of the degree, however, is not 
systematically correlated with τ . Managers with degrees from schools in the US News list of top 
25 colleges do not have higher levels of measured strategic ability. This result is robust to using 
the top 50 colleges. 
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Ownership structure: Ownership structure may be systematically related to manager 
ability because of incentives and experience. We find that CLECs that are subsidiaries of larger 
telecommunications companies tend to have lower measured ability (row 2). We see two 
possible explanations for this: these managers have fewer incentives to be cautious in entry 
decisions because they will be rewarded based on how fast their units grow and their loss can be 
covered by the mother company; or these managers were chosen to run a subsidiary business 
because they are either less skilled or less experienced than the others. We believe the former is 
more likely because the managers of subsidiaries are older and have more years experience than 
the other CLEC managers in our sample. Also consistent with a role for incentives, we find that 
private firms are more strategic than publicly-owned firms (row 3), although this result is not 
robust to all specifications. Venture capital backing is positively related to ability in many 
specifications (row 4). One possible explanation for this is that venture capitalists communicate 
their experience in entering new industries to the companies they support. Therefore, venture-
backed CLECs drew on more experience than other new firms and consequently were more 
likely to consider their competition in their decisions.  
Table 2 columns 2 through 4 show robustness to a number of alternative specifications. 
Column 2 defines potential entrants only as those 79 firms that did eventually enter the CLEC 
market rather than all firms licensed to do so. The core results described above are unchanged, 
some with significance even increased. Column 3 adds population as a predictor of strategic 
ability. The signs of the results of column 1 are unchanged though venture capital, manager over 
55, and manager has graduate degree lose significance. The sign on population is significant and 
large (row 12). This result is consistent with Goldfarb and Yang (2008) who found that firms 
operating in urban areas tend to have higher values of τ . Column 4 uses an alternative functional 
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form for τ : ( )0j jK Zτ γ γ= Φ + , where ( ).Φ  is the density function of the standard normal 
distribution and K  is the maximum number of types we allow for estimation. As expected, the 
only major change is in the value of the constant in τ , which is identified off functional form. 
Still, the average value of τ  does not change much (3.5 rather than 3.4). 
 
5.2) Are CLECs sufficiently strategic? 
The average value of τ  is 3.4 (derived from the estimates in table 2 column 1), meaning 
3% of firms are type 0, 11% are type 1, 19% are type 2, 22% are type 3, 19% are type 4, and 
26% are type 5 or higher. The average value is at the high end of the range found in Camerer, 
Ho, and Chong (2004), although it is well below their maximum of 4.9. We view this as 
providing support for the CH model: given that this is a more important decision than those faced 
by typical laboratory subjects, we expect the value of τ  to be higher. Still, we want to be 
cautious in our interpretation of the value of τ  because the constant (row 1) is only identified on 
the functional form. We are much more comfortable comparing the relative importance of 
manager and firm characteristics to strategic ability and comparing the value across years using 
the same functional form than interpreting the level of τ  in any absolute sense. 
 
5.3) Are more strategic firms more likely to survive? 
Next, we examine whether the CLECs that we estimated to be more sophisticated are, in 
fact, more successful. Given that such a large percentage of firms failed, especially after 
telecommunications stocks crashed in 2001, we use survival as our measure of success. We use 
three different measures of survival: whether the CLEC exited within 2 years, within 4 years, and 
within 6 years. Firms that merged or were acquired are not considered to have exited the 
industry. Therefore exit means that the firm is no longer operating in the industry. We expect that 
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the level of ability in 1998 will have a weaker relationship with survival as time passes. We 
predict each firm’s τ  based on the coefficients in Table 2 column 1 and the firm’s 
characteristics. We then regress exit on the predicted τ  using a probit. 
Table 3 shows that τ  is negatively correlated with early exit from the industry. We take 
exit within 4 years as the benchmark result because 2002 is right after the valuation crash. 
Column 3 shows that there is a significantly negative marginal effect of τ on exit of about 14%. 
Since the value of τ  is predicted from a simple log linear function of firm and manager 
characteristics, it is important to be cautious in this interpretation. The results will be a 
consequence of spurious correlation to the extent that firm and manager characteristics drive 
survival for reasons other than strategic ability. Consistent with the prior literature (e.g. Dunne, 
Roberts, and Samuelson 1988), we especially suspect that firm age has effects on firm survival, 
independent of τ . As a robustness check, we run the same probit regressions of exit on τ  
conditioning on log of firm age. The results are robust. 
 
5.4) What happens as strategic ability changes? 
The purpose of this sub-section is to better understand how ability drives entry decisions. 
We simulate what would happen if strategic ability was higher or lower than estimated. In 
particular, we add or subtract a constant from the estimated value of τ  in order to set the average 
value of τ  to be 2, 3, 4, and 5. We then simulate how the CLECs would behave based on these 
different assumptions and our parameter estimates in table 2 column 1. We also simulate the 
consequences of all firms being type 0. Figures 2 and 3 show the results. 
Figure 2 shows the number of entrants per market as strategic ability changes. If all firms 
are type 0, then there is substantial over-entry with 61% of markets having 5 or more 
competitors. As τ  rises, the proportion of truly naïve (type 0) players decreases. Rather, when τ  
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averages two, too many firms anticipate naïve competitors’ over-entry. As a consequence of this 
(incorrect) anticipation, CLECs are hesitant to enter and 56% of markets experience no entry at 
all. Then with further increases in τ , firms become better at conjecturing the behavior of 
competitors and consequently fewer markets have no competitors and more markets have one to 
four competitors. Gradually as τ  increases, the entry rate stabilizes. 
By construction, this means that fewer firms will have ex post regret about their decisions 
as strategic ability increases. By “regret”, we mean that firms would have made a different 
decision had they correctly conjectured competitor behavior. Figure 3 shows the levels of regret 
as strategic ability changes. When all firms are type 0, too many firms enter and firms regret half 
of all decisions and nearly all entry decisions. As strategic ability increases, the nature of regret 
changes: firms regret not entering markets that have few competitors.13 When τ  averages 2, 
firms regret 32% of decisions. The vast majority of these regrets are decisions not to enter. As τ  
increases past 2, regret continues to fall for both entry and non-entry decisions. At the average 
value predicted in the estimation (3.4), firms regret 7% of decisions. When τ  is 5, firms regret 
just 2% of decisions. Therefore, strategic ability lowers regret. More interestingly, the types of 
decisions regretted change as the average level of strategic ability changes. 
Overall, strategic ability does not have a monotonic relationship with the level of 
competition. At very low levels of ability, firms over-enter. As ability rises, they start to under-
enter. Once ability is high enough, the level of competition balances out across markets: more 
markets have just a few competitors.  This result contrasts sharply with Goldfarb and Yang 
(2008) who found that strategic ability monotonically slows the diffusion of a new technology 
(i.e. it reduces entry). This contrast highlights the importance of the parameter estimates and 
                                                            
13 In reading figure 3, note that the number of entrants and non-entrants varies as strategic ability changes. 
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actually conducting the simulations. The effects of changing strategic ability depend on the 
average observed entry level and the variance in the estimated level of ability. 
 
5.5) How does strategic ability evolve over time? 
Table 4 repeats the analysis in table 2 column 1 using data from 2000, 2002, and 2004. 
The measure of ability requires a different interpretation in these later years because firms could 
observe what competitors did in the prior periods. Therefore, a simultaneous entry game is less 
appropriate in this setting. Rather than focus on interpreting the coefficients, we focus on the 
change in measured ability over time and examine whether the industry as a whole moves to a 
more sophisticated level.14 The mean and variance of τ  change substantially over time. In 1998, 
the average firm has a τ  of 3.4. This value decreases to 3.2 in 2000 and 2002 during the height 
of the boom and the volatile years that immediately followed. Then in 2004, with the recovery 
underway, τ  increases substantially to 6.1. We interpret the increase in measured ability after the 
shakeout as supporting evidence for an evolution towards the steady equilibrium outcome 
assumed in much of the existing simultaneous entry literature (e.g. Greenstein and Mazzeo 
2006). 
At the same time, the variance across firms increases over time from 0.6 in 1998 to 7.8 in 
2004. Comparing the minima and maxima of τ  across years, it seems that the increased variation 
is driven by the emergence of highly sophisticated firms in later years. It also indicates that 
although the industry as a whole increases in sophistication over time, the naivety is a persistent 
phenomenon. Given that this is an industry with a high turnover rate and that we already found 
that new firms are less likely to act strategically, this pattern is not surprising. Some questions, 
                                                            
14 Most of the relationships found in the 1998 data remain in later years: the number of competitors is negatively 
correlated with entry, older firms and managers with graduate degrees are more sophisticated, and subsidiaries of 
large firms and young managers are less sophisticated. The only significant reversal of signs is that venture capital 
financed firms appear less sophisticated than others in 2002 and 2004 but more sophisticated in 1998 and 2000. 
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however, still follow: do the smart get smarter, while the less strategic firms exit? Or does the 
entire industry learn over time? And do firms learn from past successes and failures? The 
dynamic implications of these questions, although beyond the scope of this project, warrant 
future research. 
 
6) Conclusions 
Overall, our approach provides insights into the incidence of strategic ability in a new 
market: local telephone competition following the 1996 Act. By combining structural 
econometric techniques and behavioral game theory, we show that firm behavior is related to 
manager and firm characteristics in a systematic way. Generally, older firms with educated, 
experienced managers make decisions that suggest they are better able to correctly conjecture 
competitive behavior.  
Three aspects of our results suggest considerable validity for the CH model in this setting, 
especially in 1998. First, the coefficient estimates are suggestive that the strategic ability 
parameter, τ , is correlated with intelligence and experience. Managers that are trained in 
economics or business (and therefore are particularly likely to have been exposed to game 
theory) are estimated to be more sophisticated. Further, managers with graduate degrees and 
managers with more experience (measured by years in the industry and age) are estimated to be 
more sophisticated. Second, our estimate of τ  increases following the shakeout suggesting that 
the industry became more sophisticated in its aftermath. The estimate of τ  is also within the 
range found in many laboratory experiments. Third, our strategic ability parameter correlates 
with out-of-sample success: those firms estimated to be less strategic in 1998 are more likely to 
exit the industry early.  
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As with any empirical work, this paper has a number of limitations. First, we measure a 
very specific type of ability: the ability to correctly conjecture competitor behavior. There are 
many other dimensions of managerial ability and we cannot say anything about these. Second, 
the analysis is not a test of CH against Nash because the Nash concept is not nested in our model 
and therefore not testable. Still, we argue that our results have both internal and external validity. 
For internal validity, the signs of the covariates on firm and manager characteristics are 
consistent with the idea that model measures strategic ability. For external validity, we show that 
firms that are estimated to have higher levels of ability were less likely to exit. We also rely on 
the experimental literature that has generally supports many of our modeling assumptions. 
Finally, the empirical setting may differ from the model in ways that may affect the results. For 
example, there may be unobserved reasons why some markets are particularly attractive to 
inexperienced firms that are not a consequence of strategic considerations. Further, while we 
observe the industry very close to its inception, the game is not truly simultaneous and the extent 
to which actions are observable may bias our results toward a higher level of ability. 
In summary, we have provided a structural framework for estimating strategic ability 
using revealed preference in a real-world setting. The unique solution to this structural model 
means that we can include manager and firm characteristics in our analysis. In contrast, entry 
models that use the Nash equilibrium concept often have multiple equilibria that force analysis to 
be at the market level rather than the firm level. Our results help explain several aspects of early 
competition in local telephone markets: firms run by educated older managers operated in 
markets with fewer competitors and firms that operated in markets with fewer competitors were 
more likely to survive. This framework may prove useful in other settings where firms make 
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simultaneous decisions including other entry decisions, retailer choices to stock new products, 
and auctions.  
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Table 1a: Descriptive Statistics by CLEC 
  1998  2000  2002  2004 
Variable  Mean  Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev 
# markets available to enter  61.520  66.852  75.692  70.676  90.312  70.634  92.375  73.670 
# markets entered  4.916  9.3624  11.350  16.521  15.671  16.787  16.946  17.397 
                 
Firm age  7.927  17.899  11.025  20.769  10.281  14.893  12.660  15.795 
Subsidiary  0.312  0.465  0.282  0.451  0.218  0.416  0.321  0.471 
Privately owned  0.645  0.480  0.581  0.495  0.625  0.487  0.678  0.471 
Financed by venture capital  0.177  0.383  0.222  0.417  0.296  0.460  0.142  0.353 
Exit by 2000  0.218  0.415  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Exit by 2002  0.510  0.502  0.495  0.502  N/A  N/A 
Exit by 2004  0.593  0.493  0.606  0.490  0.218  0.416  N/A 
 
Manager characteristics (conditional on being observed) 
Any economics or business degree  0.783  0.415  0.691  0.465  0.755  0.434  0.731  0.448 
Any graduate degree  0.583  0.496  0.535  0.501  0.551  0.501  0.549  0.502 
Any engineering or science Degree  0.396  0.493  0.368  0.485  0.372  0.488  0.382  0.491 
Any degree from US News top 25 school  0.400  0.493  0.304  0.463  0.275  0.450  0.294  0.460 
Age  46.619  9.040  48.912  8.590  48.297  7.138  49.512  7.599 
Experience  18.436  8.162  19.882  11.013  19.685  9.683  21.187  9.120 
         
# observations (CLECs)  96  117  64  56 
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Table 1b: Descriptive statistics by market (N=234) 
 
Variable  Mean  Std Dev  Min  Max 
Population (in thousands)  224.07  160.84  100.27  951.27 
% African American  0.178  0.180  0.003  0.840 
Median Age  32.80  3.079  22.9  41.8 
Household Size  2.636  0.418  2.03  4.55 
% Foreign Born  0.156  0.125  0.011  0 .721 
Household Income (in $1000)  41.67  11.67  23.48  88.77 
% unemployed  0.079  0.040  0.023  0.290 
 
 
 
Table 1c: Descriptive statistics by CLEC‐market 
  1998 2000 2002  2004
  Mean  Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev  Mean Std Dev
Entry  0.0799  0.271  0.1501  0.357  0.173  0.378  0.183  0.387 
Population (in thousands)  222.40  160.76  226.30  163.45  229.02  165.73  228.34  166.95 
% African American  0.169  0.170  0.176  0.173  0.188  0.179  0.184  0.178 
Median Age  32.75  3.13  32.79  3.14  32.86  3.10  32.83  3.10 
Household Size  2.67  0.440  2.65  0.426  2.62  0.404  2.63  0.413 
% Foreign Born  0.171  0.131 0.165  0.129  0.156  0.127  0.159  0.127 
Household Income (in $1000)  42.33  12.16  41.74  12.00  41.05  11.70  41.28  11.83 
% unemployed  0.079  0.040  0.079  0.039  0.081  0.042  0.080  0.041 
Privately owned  0.432  0.495  0.409  0.491  0.439  0.496  0.524  0.499 
Financed by venture capital  0.160  0.367  0.193  0.394  0.269  0.443  0.179  0.383 
Firm age  13.71  27.26  10.85  19.11  12.94  21.84  15.48  23.04 
Subsidiary  0.211  0.408  0.174  0.379  0.182  0.386  0.278  0.448 
Experience  15.54  9.87  16.50  12.23  17.02  11.33  18.08  10.80 
Age below 40  0.159  0.365  0.119  0.324  0.067  0.251  0.046  0.211 
Age above 55  0.243  0.429  0.254  0.435  0.248  0.432  0.240  0.427 
Any graduate degree  0.573  0.494  0.456  0.498  0.501  0.500  0.489  0.499 
Any economics or business degree  0.553  0.497  0.432  0.495  0.636  0.481  0.560  0.496 
Any engineering or science Degree  0.225  0.418  0.262  0.440  0.330  0.470  0.332  0.471 
Any degree from US News top 25  0.409  0.491  0.264  0.441  0.271  0.445  0.300  0.458 
Experience missing  0.164  0.370  0.143  0.350  0.122  0.328  0.110  0.313 
Age missing  0.076  0.265  0.148  0.355  0.148  0.355  0.152  0.359 
Education missing  0.135  0.342 0.181 0.385 0.033 0.180  0.038 0.192
   
# observations (CLECs‐markets)  5906 8869 5780  5173
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Table 2: Strategic ability and entry coefficients for 1998 
      (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
 
Variables  Main  Potential entry 
means entered 
by end of 2004 
Allow firms τ to 
vary by market 
size 
Alternative 
functional 
form
0( )j jK Zτ γ γ= Φ +  
Co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s 
on
 s
tr
at
eg
ic
 a
bi
lit
y 
pa
ra
m
et
er
 τ 
(1)  Log (firm age) 
0.096 
(0.018)*** 
0.151 
(0.026)*** 
0.124 
(0.022)*** 
0.122 
(0.019)*** 
(2)  Subsidiary 
‐0.069 
(0.035)** 
‐0.273 
(0.050)*** 
‐0.144 
(0.042)*** 
‐0.183 
(0.035)*** 
(3)  Privately owned 
0.138 
(0.038)*** 
‐0.017 
(0.037) 
‐0.036 
(0.043) 
0.020 
(0.033) 
(4)  Venture capital 
0.104 
(0.050)** 
0.009 
(0.047) 
0.087 
(0.054) 
0.014 
(0.041) 
(5) 
Manager has graduate 
degree 
0.096 
(0.034)*** 
0.098 
(0.036)*** 
0.060 
(0.039) 
0.116 
(0.034)*** 
(6) 
Manager has degree in 
economics or business 
0.088 
(0.032)*** 
0.123 
(0.037)*** 
0.079 
(0.039)** 
0.069 
(0.031)** 
(7) 
Manager has degree in 
engineering or science 
0.040 
(0.036) 
0.157 
(0.046)*** 
0.053 
(0.046) 
0.076 
(0.038)* 
(8) 
Manager has degree from 
US News top 25 
‐0.046 
(0.033) 
‐0.077 
(0.035)** 
‐0.012 
(0.034) 
‐0.056 
(0.032)* 
(9)  Manager age below 40 
‐0.196 
(0.057)*** 
‐0.082 
(0.040)** 
‐0.257 
(0.059)*** 
‐0.077 
(0.035)** 
(10)  Manager age above 55 
0.090 
(0.034)*** 
0.060 
(0.034)* 
0.033 
(0.038) 
0.049 
(0.030) 
(11) 
Log (manager years of 
experience in industry) 
0.0618 
(0.033)* 
0.018 
(0.035) 
0.032 
(0.039) 
0.044 
(0.031) 
 
(12) 
Place population in 
millions 
    1.282 
(0.227)*** 
 
(13) 
Years of experience 
missing 
0.0529 
(0.100) 
0.006 
(0.106) 
0.072 
(0.019) 
0.078 
(0.091) 
(14)  Manager age missing 
‐0.163 
(0.047)*** 
0.095 
(0.050)* 
‐0.064 
(0.058) 
‐0.012 
(0.043) 
(15) 
Manager education 
missing 
0.002 
(0.033) 
0.020 
(0.036) 
‐0.008 
(0.038) 
0.016 
(0.032) 
(16)  Constant in τ 0.837 
(0.108)*** 
0.779 
(0.122)*** 
0.464 
(0.160)*** 
‐0.565 
(0.098)*** 
Co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s 
on
 e
nt
ry
 
(17)  # of competitors 
‐0.961 
(0.070)*** 
‐0.809 
(0.078)*** 
‐0.687 
(0.063)*** 
‐0.947 
(0.069)*** 
(18) 
Place population in 
millions 
16.159 
(1.072)*** 
10.073 
(1.026)*** 
7.136 
(0.884)*** 
11.337 
(0.961)*** 
(19)  % black 
2.489 
(0.777)*** 
5.117 
(0.823)*** 
2.172 
(0.679)*** 
4.346 
(0.821)*** 
(20)  Median age 
‐0.037 
(0.036) 
0.072 
(0.037)* 
0.115 
(0.036)*** 
0.082 
(0.038)** 
(21)  Household size 
‐2.470 
(0.358)*** 
‐1.908 
(0.373)*** 
‐2.790 
(0.340)*** 
‐2.014 
(0.372)*** 
(22)  % foreign born 
3.217 
(1.193)*** 
7.041 
(1.237)*** 
6.794 
(1.155)*** 
5.192 
(1.215)*** 
(23)  HH income in $1000 
‐0.066 
(0.591) 
‐0.231 
(0.544) 
‐0.437 
(0.532) 
‐0.317 
(0.542) 
(24)  % unemployed 
26.883 
(4.867)*** 
‐5.401 
(3.147)* 
10.184 
(2.993)*** 
1.593 
(2.742) 
(25)  Constant 
2.029 
(2.258) 
0.237 
(2.246) 
1.617 
(2.245) 
0.253 
(2.268) 
    # of CLECs  96  79  96  96 
    # of CLEC‐markets  5906  5699  5906  5906 
    Log Likelihood  ‐1378.0  ‐1324.9  ‐1306.7  ‐1308.5 
*significant at 90% confidence level. **significant at 95% confidence level. ***significant at 99% confidence level. 
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Table 3: Firms with a higher τ are more likely to exit the industry early 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
  Exit by 2000  Exit by 2002 Exit by 2004τ   ‐0.138 
(0.078)* 
‐0.157
(0.091)* 
‐0.137
(.079)* 
‐0.160
(0.091)* 
‐0.105 
(0.072) 
‐0.066
(0.083) 
Log(firm age)    0.024
(0.058) 
0.029
(0.056) 
  ‐0.046
(0.050) 
Constant  0.909 
(0.721) 
1.001
(0.754) 
1.654
(0.759)** 
1.768
(0.792)** 
1.776 
(0.800)** 
1.563
(0.833)*** 
Log Likelihood  ‐61.387  ‐61.300 ‐60.875 ‐60.740 ‐53.978  ‐53.537
Notes: Probit regression of exit on τ and firm age using the τ calculated in Table 2 col. 1 (1998). Marginal effects reported. N=96. 
*significant at 90% confidence level. **significant at 95% confidence level. ***significant at 99% confidence level. 
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Table 4: Strategic ability and entry coefficients for 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004 
      (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
 
Variables  1998 (as 
Table 2) 
2000  2002  2004 
Co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s 
on
 s
tr
at
eg
ic
 a
bi
lit
y 
pa
ra
m
et
er
 τ 
(1)  Log (firm age) 
0.096 
(0.018)*** 
0.034 
(0.007)*** 
0.157 
(0.063)** 
0.226 
(0.098)** 
(2)  Subsidiary 
‐0.069 
(0.035)** 
‐0.024 
(0.016) 
‐0.078 
(0.087) 
‐0.377 
(0.116)*** 
(3)  Privately owned 
0.138 
(0.038)*** 
‐0.030 
(0.019) 
0.236 
(0.130)* 
0.234 
(0.110)** 
(4)  Venture capital 
0.104 
(0.050)** 
0.064 
(0.020)*** 
‐0.107 
(0.122) 
‐0.177 
(0.103)* 
(5) 
Manager has graduate 
degree 
0.096 
(0.034)*** 
0.037 
(0.014)*** 
0.177 
(0.097)* 
0.170 
(0.105) 
(6) 
Manager has degree in 
economics or business 
0.088 
(0.032)*** 
0.046 
(0.015)*** 
‐0.060 
(0.079) 
0.094 
(0.103) 
(7) 
Manager has degree in 
engineering or science 
0.040 
(0.036) 
0.050 
(0.015)*** 
0.185 
(0.094)** 
0.107 
(0.118) 
(8) 
Manager has degree from 
US News top 25 
‐0.046 
(0.033) 
0.001 
(0.015) 
‐0.095 
(0.091) 
0.052 
(0.133) 
(9)  Manager age below 40 
‐0.196 
(0.057)*** 
‐0.067 
(0.017)*** 
‐0.281 
(0.125)** 
‐0.387 
(0.195)** 
(10)  Manager age above 55 
0.090 
(0.034)*** 
0.006 
(0.014) 
‐0.092 
(0.099) 
0.127 
(0.120) 
(11) 
Log (manager years of 
experience in industry) 
0.0618 
(0.033)* 
‐0.039 
(0.009)*** 
‐0.014 
(0.058) 
‐0.054 
(0.101) 
(12) 
Years of experience 
missing 
0.0529 
(0.100) 
‐0.175 
(0.032)*** 
0.628 
(0.278)** 
1.643 
(5.816) 
(13)  Manager age missing 
‐0.163 
(0.047)*** 
0.047 
(0.020)** 
‐0.550 
(0.198)*** 
0.322 
(0.219) 
(14) 
Manager education 
missing 
0.002 
(0.033) 
0.044 
(0.017)** 
‐0.069 
(0.097) 
‐0.119 
(0.129) 
  (15)  Constant in τ 0.837 
(0.108)*** 
1.157 
(0.042)*** 
0.755 
(0.257)*** 
0.509 
(0.422) 
Co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s 
on
 e
nt
ry
 
(16)  # of competitors 
‐0.961 
(0.070)*** 
‐0.546 
(0.028)*** 
‐0.343 
(0.055)*** 
‐0.357 
(0.039)*** 
(17) 
Place population in 
millions 
16.159 
(1.072)*** 
10.634 
(0.821)*** 
6.824 
(0.877)*** 
7.066 
(0.744)*** 
(18)  % black 
2.489 
(0.777)*** 
9.859 
(0.698)*** 
2.752 
(0.575)*** 
2.007 
(0.504)*** 
(19)  Median age 
‐0.037 
(0.036) 
0.002 
(0.025) 
0.009 
(0.026) 
‐0.003 
(0.026) 
(20)  Household size 
‐2.470 
(0.358)*** 
‐0.571 
(0.294)* 
‐0.620 
(0.221)*** 
‐0.284 
(0.241) 
(21)  % foreign born 
3.217 
(1.193)*** 
6.726 
(0.754)*** 
‐0.123 
(0.659) 
‐2.947 
(0.656)*** 
(22)  HH income in $1000 
‐0.066 
(0.591) 
‐0.330 
(0.402) 
‐0.126 
(0.303) 
‐0.061 
(0.306) 
(23)  % unemployed 
26.883 
(4.867)*** 
‐0.913 
(2.989) 
3.378 
(2.207) 
2.713 
(2.077) 
(24)  Constant 
2.029 
(2.258) 
‐0.100 
(1.793) 
‐0.015 
(1.513) 
‐0.075 
(1.536) 
    Mean τ 3.427  3.177  3.205  6.141 
    Standard deviation τ 0.644  0.231  1.132  7.767 
    Minimum τ 1.935  2.597  1.696  1.221 
    Maximum τ  4.764  3.909  9.261  31.021 
    # of CLECs  96  117  64  56 
    # of CLEC‐markets  5906  8869  5780  5173 
    Log Likelihood  ‐1378.0  ‐3201.8  ‐2321.7  ‐2127.3 
*significant at 90% confidence level. **significant at 95% confidence level. ***significant at 99% confidence level.
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